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Executive summary 
The massive earthquake that struck northern parts of Pakistan and India on 8 October 2005 led to 
the loss of more than 75 000 lives, severely injured approximately 100 000 and left 2.8 million 
without shelter. The relief response was immediate: first by the local communities and NGOs, then 
by the Pakistani Army, the United Nations agencies and international NGOs. Destroyed roads and 
areas being located at high altitudes caused problems for mapping the destruction and bringing in 
relief supplies. The relief operation was demanding and there was a race against time to provide 
assistance before the onset of winter and into the most remote areas. Fortunately, the winter was 
milder and with less snow than usual, limiting the threat to the large number of refugees who had 
sought shelter in the numerous camps established. By late May 2006, a large number of refugees 
had returned, but still 100 000 remain in camps as return is deemed unsafe; they are judged to be 
vulnerable or land ownership is disputed.   
 
The Norwegian Government responded quickly and prioritised support to Norwegian NGOs with 
prior experience and networks in Pakistan, to a Pakistani NGO with a strong local presence and to 
UN agencies. In addition, Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap (DSB) was funded to 
establish camps for relief workers. The Norwegian Refugee Council’s Emergency Preparedness 
Staff were seconded to a number of organisations, and Norwegian emergency equipment was 
frequently used. The second round of Norwegian funding was directed towards UN agencies, in 
support of the new Cluster approach for the coordination of emergency assistance. The total 
Norwegian earthquake assistance was NOK 522 million, making Norway one of the largest donors. 
By the year-end 2005, UN statistics showed that Norway funded ¼ of the UN earthquake relief 
efforts in Pakistan. The early visits paid to the field by the Norwegian Prime Minister and the 
Minister of International Development were highly appreciated by the Pakistani Government and 
NGO community. The collaboration between NGOs and the MFA and the embassy in Islamabad 
was deemed good, although NGOs would have welcomed more financial support in the second 
round of funding. The MFA and the embassy are advised to review their secondment, reporting and 
profiling policy following emergencies, and thereby identify capacities to be strengthened on either 
side.  
 
The assistance and management support provided by the Norwegian NGOs are highly regarded by 
the Government of Pakistan, the UN and beneficiaries and deemed to be professional, effective and 
efficient. The NGOs drew heavily on their previous experience in Pakistan and in other emergency 
relief operations. They reportedly had good collaboration with the Pakistani army and central and 
local government officials, and prioritised participation in relevant clusters over establishing 
separate collaboration mechanisms. It is noted, moreover, that several of the NGOs made efforts to 
strengthen local partner organisations and to take on longer-term perspectives for assistance, 
thereby increasing national NGO and government response capacity for future emergencies.   
 
The new UN Cluster approach was tested out in Pakistan, assigning responsibilities as Cluster 
Heads to agencies with technical expertise, with OCHA holding an overall coordination 
responsibility. Two agencies assumed responsibility for three clusters: UNICEF led education, 
protection and water/sanitation clusters and WFP led nutrition, IT/communications and logistics 
clusters. The remaining clusters were distributed between IOM for shelter, UNDP for early 
recovery, UNHCR for camp management, and WHO for health. 
 
While the general verdict is that the cluster approach is an improvement, a number of weaknesses 
have been identified that need further attention. The UN was slow in getting the cluster system 
working beyond Islamabad and communication between clusters and between the field and the 
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centre was weak. The quality of coordination varied, and depended largely on the management 
qualification of the cluster heads and their ability to prioritise time for the cluster coordination – and 
their ability to differentiate between agency and cluster interests. Gender issues were not prioritised, 
despite the fact that women had taken on much of the early responsibility in the villages and were 
vulnerable in the camp environment, given local traditions. 
 
Several of the UN agencies were reluctant to assume cluster responsibility, and those heading 
several clusters appeared overstretched. The system could be improved by allowing other UN 
agencies, or non-UN organisations, to assume cluster head responsibility. IOM came out on a 
positive note when they had their coordination capacity strengthened, while the IFRC could benefit 
from revisiting their policy stance of refusing such responsibility. There is also a need to review the 
role of national governments and national NGOs in the clusters, and how information sharing and 
joint analysis can be improved. 
 
The Norwegian decision to strengthen the cluster approach by channelling funding through clusters 
raised a number of issues that need further attention from the MFA, OCHA and UN agencies. One 
is certainly the bureaucratic reluctance to channel funding to cluster members that was 
demonstrated by some UN agencies; the other is their lack of willingness to abide by decisions 
made in cluster and Head of Cluster meetings. In contrast, the IOM demonstrated how a bidding 
process can be performed within the cluster structure, and the technical working groups provided 
standards that helped curb corruption. Another important issue is to clarify responsibility for 
monitoring and reporting, and to see if procedures for fund transfers (and applying administrative 
overhead costs) can be made more flexible.  
 
Two important lessons emerge from the testing of the cluster approach in Pakistan. One is that 
while funding should be provided for the establishing and running of clusters, direct funding for 
cluster activities should only start after the clusters have been able to set their priorities and have 
identified project and funding gaps. The second is that there is an urgent need to establish training 
for cluster coordinators, focusing on management and communication skills and the ability to head 
a very diverse team.  
 
The review has identified four areas for possible further attention from the MFA; a closer review of 
how the UN agencies, and notably UNICEF, have utilised the Norwegian funding is of the highest 
priority. 
 
In a comment to this Report, the Norwegian Embassy in Pakistan welcomes the review and its 
findings as well as its recommendations. An additional recommendation from the Embassy is to 
conduct such a review while the relief operations are ongoing.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to review the 
Norwegian-funded assistance following the earthquake that struck northern parts of Pakistan and 
India on 8 October 2005.  This review covers the assistance provided in Pakistan; the Terms of 
Reference are attached in Annex I. 
 
The team that undertook the review comprised Arne Strand (team leader) from the Chr. Michelsen 
Institute and Kaja Borchgrevink (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo). In the field logistical 
assistance was provided by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC), and the Norwegian Embassy in Islamabad assisted with setting up 
interview appointments. 
 
The team undertook a desk review of available literature, agency reports and Norwegian policy and 
funding decisions before departing to the field. From 24 April to 7 May 2006 interviews were 
conducted in Islamabad and the earthquake-affected areas with the Ambassador and staff at the 
Norwegian Embassy, officials of the Pakistani Government, local civil officials and army personnel, 
local authorities in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), earthquake victims in a number of locations, 
heads of UN agencies and locally based staff, Norwegian NGOs and their Pakistan-based partner 
organisations, staff from Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap (DSB), Pakistani NGOs 
and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Upon return to Norway further 
discussions were held with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian NGOs. For details see 
the interview list, Annex II. 
 
The report provides a brief outline of the scale and effects of the earthquake, introduces the 
assistance efforts of the Pakistani, international and Norwegian actors, presents and discusses the 
new cluster approach, and reviews Norwegian assistance in detail before reaching general 
conclusions and suggesting some issues in need of further attention. 
 
The final report has benefited from valuable comments from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Norwegian Embassy in Pakistan. 
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2. The earthquake and the response 
a. Time and scale of the earthquake 
In the morning of 8 October 2005 northern parts of Pakistan, India and Afghanistan were struck by 
an earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale. The length of the quake and the fact that the 
epicentre was rather close to the surface led to immense destruction in the affected areas. ‘What was 
built up over 58 years, collapsed in 58 seconds’, was the reflection of one governmental official. 
b. Areas affected, displacement and number of casualties 
The earthquake epicentre was located approximately 19 km from Muzaffarabad, the capital city of 
Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The earthquake, caused by a collision of the South Asian and 
Eurasian tectonic plates, was felt from Afghanistan through to northern India, and devastated an 
area of approx. 28 000 square kilometres in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and 
Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK).1 The earthquake caused the death of as many as 75 331 people,2 
severely injured approximately 100 0003 and left 2.8 million people without shelter (the estimate of 
persons with damaged or destroyed homes was later revised to 3.5 million).4 Thus, it is likely that 
between 3.2 and 3.5 million people were severely affected by the earthquake and in need of 
assistance.5 
 
The earthquake struck at 08:50 in the morning, a time when government officials had just reached 
their offices, children had started school, and many women were inside their houses. The collapse 
of as much as 84% of the physical structures in AJK and 36 % in NWFP6 caused the deaths of 
thousands of people and put most public offices, health facilities and schools out of operation. The 
earthquake further caused enormous damage to infrastructure such as roads and bridges, cutting off 
huge areas from main road access, and electricity and water supplies were severely affected. This 
made both search and rescue and relief work incredibly challenging. The high degree of work 
migration of able-bodied men from the earthquake-affected areas to cities in Pakistan and abroad 
left women and elderly men with the responsibility for organising rescues within the villages and 
for making decisions on whether to leave the affected areas. 
 
It should be noted that while the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) is part of Pakistan, albeit 
with some parts defined as Tribal Areas, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) has a nominally 
autonomous status in Pakistan, with its own elected President, Prime Minister, Legislature, and 
High Court.    
 
                                                     
1 Pakistan 2005 Earthquake - Early Recovery Framework, UNDP (November 2005). 
2 www.pakistan.gov.pk/donor/earthquake_factsfigures,jsp, accessed 30 May 2006. 
3 International Crisis Group, Asia Brief No. 46 Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake (March 2006). 
4 Pakistan 2005 Earthquake - Early Recovery Framework, UNDP (November 2005).  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid. 
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Illustration 1: Map of Affected Areas, with indication of IDP areas of origin (Source: HIC)  
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c. Challenges to the relief operation 
The geography of the affected region, with a remote and scattered population, difficult access due to 
blocked roads and continued aftershocks and landslides, complicated the relief effort and made air 
transport essential.  
 
This also meant it was difficult and therefore took a long time to get an overview of the actual 
numbers of casualties, and of how many stayed behind and would spend the winter in the high 
valleys. 
 
Heavy rain and early snowfall in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, combined with the 
expectation of a hard winter, necessitated a ‘race’ to get winterised tents, blankets and clothing 
distributed before the onset of winter. 
Data 
While a number of organisations collaborated on data collection and needs assessments, there seems 
to have been a critical gap in data consolidation and joint analysis. It took some time before anyone 
realised the full impact of the earthquake and the number of casualties kept rising until December 
2005.  
 
Numerical estimates of the effects of the earthquake, of the assistance provided and the need for 
further assistance vary greatly between the various actors involved. Data management seems to 
have been generally weak and uncoordinated throughout. The Government of Pakistan (GoP) and 
the UN operated with different numbers, as did the World Bank. The establishment of the UN 
Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) was an attempt to coordinate data collection and 
consolidation, and to provide the humanitarian community with updated maps. However, a lack of 
confidence between the different actors (the GoP distrusting the UN data, in particular) resulted in 
parallel data sets and management systems. Furthermore, the variation in definitions, such as what 
to count – a nuclear family, a shelter or a household – often makes consolidation and comparison of 
existing data impossible.   
 
While some of the data submitted by the various organisations was posted and made available on 
the HIC website, regular consolidation and analysis of the data and the situation was missing. This 
weakened capacity to identify gaps and to produce a consolidated response strategy.  It has been 
mentioned by some of the agencies we talked to that the HIC data was more technology driven than 
it was needs based.  
d. The effect on government structures  
The governments of NWFP and AJK were both badly hit by the earthquake. In the worst affected 
districts virtually all public buildings were partially damaged or completely destroyed. A substantial 
number of local civil servants and elected representatives died or were injured. The participation of 
local-level officials varied, however, between NWFP and AJK and between districts.  
 
In NWFP local-level mayors (Nazims) were about to take up office at the time of the earthquake, 
having been elected only days before. This incapacitated the local administration, resulting in a 
limited, uncoordinated and random response. While local government service delivery capacity was 
very weak, some government departments showed an interest and made efforts to participate in the 
relief work. The Department of Education, for example, approached Plan for assistance in the 
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education sector and took part in developing Plan’s education strategy. In Balakot, which is 
completely in ruins, the government is operating out of tent offices. 
 
As Muzaffarabad city was severely affected by the earthquake, the local administration in AJK 
virtually collapsed. Critics of the military-led operation stated that the military completely sidelined 
the civilian administration and ‘as a result failed to use their expertise in assessing and meeting 
local needs’.7 On a more positive note are reports of military officers being seconded to civilian 
tasks where important functions were not being managed, such as the Partwari, responsible for 
property registration. The implementing partners do, however, report that while participation varied 
both in terms of quality and quantity, the civilian administration has now entered the scene and that 
the AJK government, for instance, has been active in the Camp Management Cluster in 
Muzaffarabad.  
 
In general, collaboration between the international community and the civilian administration and 
elected representatives has been varied and often limited. This also seems to be the case for 
coordination between the federal government in Islamabad and local-level representatives in the 
affected areas. While this outcome may have been further exacerbated by the disaster, it may be due 
partly to already weak relations between the federal and provincial administrations. 
 
While the actual figures are unknown, it is established from different sources that the army also lost 
a considerable number of its own troops stationed in the earthquake hit areas and that this affected 
its ability to respond in the first 48 hours.  
e. National and international response 
The earthquake response went through a number of phases: search and rescue in the first two weeks, 
followed by an intense immediate relief period and the UN-led ‘operation winter race’ to reach out 
with winterised tents, clothing and food before the winter. At the end of March 2006, the relief 
operation moved into the recovery and reconstruction phase, with camps being closed down and 
people returned to their place of origin, or, if defined as vulnerable, allowed to stay on temporarily 
in residue camps, or alternatively to leave for other parts of Pakistan. 
The national response 
The Pakistani community, in Pakistan and abroad, responded immediately to the earthquake by 
donating funding, medicine, food and clothes. Many tried to make their way to the earthquake areas 
to assist in the early recovery, or to bring in assistance on a larger scale. The earthquake invoked a 
spirit of solidarity that led thousands of volunteers, including professionals such as doctors and 
nurses, to register themselves with Pakistani NGOs and organisations. They provided extremely 
important assistance in the early stage of the relief operation, when the army had not become fully 
operational and the international organisations were not yet in place. 
 
In Norway, despite the fact that very few Norwegians of Pakistani origin have relatives in the 
affected areas, there was a major effort to raise funds and collect relief items to be sent to Pakistan.8 
Individuals and organisations went to Pakistan to deliver the support, and later on a team of medical 
personnel from the Oslo and Tromsø University hospitals were sent to the earthquake affected 
areas. The transport was funded by the MFA. An information meeting was organised in Norway by 
the Red Cross, with the Norwegian Ambassador to Pakistan online. Visits made to Pakistan by the 
                                                     
7 International Crisis Group, Asia Brief No. 46 Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake (March 2006). 
8 Collections of approx. 2.5 mill NOK. Aftenposten web edition 18 October 2005. 
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Norwegian Prime Minister and Minister of International Development were welcomed by the 
Pakistani diaspora, Norwegian NGOs and their local counterparts. 
 
When the earthquake struck, no national disaster preparedness plan existed. However, the Pakistani 
Government responded promptly to the earthquake by mobilising the Pakistan National Army. The 
president established the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) on 12 October 2005. The FRC, 
established under military leadership, was the main body coordinating the relief operation. The 
army distributed tents, blankets and food, set up and managed IDP camps, distributed medicines and 
made available medical teams comprising medical officers and paramedics. 
 
The Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) was established on 25 
October under the Prime Minister’s Office to ‘plan, coordinate, monitor and regulate reconstruction 
& rehabilitation activities in earthquake affected areas, encouraging self reliance via private public 
partnership and community participation, ensuring financial transparencies’.9 The FRC was merged 
with ERRA on 31 March 2006 in the form of a Transitional Relief Cell integrated into ERRA, 
overlooking matters related to the transition from relief to recovery (such as the identification of 
camps to remain open). An ERRA Planning Cell has been established to oversee the transition from 
recovery to reconstruction and rehabilitation, being primarily concerned with the formulation of 
national policies for reconstruction and compensation. ERRA provincial offices have been 
established in AJK and NWFP and district advisory bodies chaired by the district Nazim/district 
Commissioner Officer established in the district concerned. Local units have been established to 
oversee and support the reconstruction process in the field.  
 
A President’s Relief Fund was immediately established. The Fund has collected USD 100 million 
from Pakistani private companies and individuals, of which the private sector in Pakistan 
contributed Rs. 8.6 billion.10 In addition, it is estimated that the Pakistani public has contributed 
approximately ten times the amount raised by the President’s Relief Fund in in-kind and cash 
contributions, though these figures seem difficult to confirm. 
 
The government has introduced a compensation policy for families that have lost members or 
suffered severe injuries (up to Rs. 500 000 per family11) and a housing reconstruction policy, where 
people able to document ownership of damaged houses, and holding national identity cards will 
receive financial compensation divided into three instalments. The first is made in cash, while the 
following two will be made to their bank account upon documentation of actual house repair. This 
is, however, not without problems, as will be discussed in more detail later in the report. 
 
While the general assessment is that the President, the government and administration, and certainly 
the Army did what was possible within given limits, the political opposition has voiced concern at 
the lack of transparency in the process. They argue that there have been no parliamentary 
consultations, not even for NATO involvement, and no insight into the spending of the President’s 
Relief Fund.  
 
There is a noted concern among international organisations over ERRA’s ability to formulate policy 
and to adapt to the challenges emerging in the rehabilitation phase, with larger involvement of the 
civil administration and civil society. This concern arises not least as ERRA continues to be staffed 
predominantly by military officers or personnel seconded from UN and other agencies. A concern 
voiced by an agency in frequent dialogue with ERRA was that a large number of the seconded 
                                                     
9 www.erra.gov.pk/WebForms/vision.aspx 
10 http://presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/media/EQ/DC/LocalDonations.pdf 
11 The exchange rate between US dollar and Pakistani Rs. was approximately 60 (Rs 500 000 equals 8 650 USD) 
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consultants first and foremost represent the interests of their own agencies rather than those of 
ERRA.    
Response of the International Community  
The international community responded immediately by sending professional rescue teams, 
emergency relief items and humanitarian aid workers. The initial response was characterised by a 
multitude of actors, responding in the first phase in a largely uncoordinated manner. The Norwegian 
response will be discussed in more detail below. 
The UN Response and the Cluster Approach 
The UN brought in the first UNDAC rescue team within a day and established a coordination centre 
under the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Islamabad; four regional hubs were 
established in the earthquake affected areas. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) assumed the coordination responsibility, in close collaboration with 
other UN organisations and the Government of Pakistan. OCHA was plagued with rapid changes of 
staff in the initial period, but gradually assumed a more prominent coordination role. 
 
The decision to use the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) ‘cluster’ concept was made on 
the first day of the disaster, 8 October 2005. The concept provides for a single focal point or ‘lead’ 
for ‘coordination of policy formulation, standard-setting, operational programming, and guideline 
promulgation’.12 Cluster leads were designated in an open meeting with UN agencies, donors and 
NGOs on 9 October. The cluster concept is part of the ongoing UN reform process and was used for 
the first time in the Pakistan earthquake response.  
 
While the decision to apply the cluster coordination concept was taken rapidly, it took time before 
the system became operational both in Islamabad and in the field. This delayed the response and 
effectiveness of the UN system during the first four weeks. (The cluster approach experience is 
discussed in greater detail below). 
The flash appeals/donor conferences 
The UN initiated a Consolidated Appeal Process, issuing a first flash appeal for USD 311,876,000 
on 11 October 2005. As the actual impact of the earthquake became clearer and the need for 
immediate relief before the onset of winter was realised, this amount was increased to USD 
549,585,941 on 26 October 2005.13 
 
While it took time to realise the devastating impact of the earthquake, it took even longer for the 
international community to respond with the resources required. The GoP donor conference on 19 
October 2005 received pledges of only USD 67, 8 million, 12% of the estimated requirements at the 
time.14  In view of the tsunami and other recent natural disasters, this contributed to a concern about 
donor fatigue. At the second GoP donor conference held on 19 November 2005 the pledges were 
raised to USD 6.5 billion, divided between USD 2.5 billion in grants and USD 4 billion in loans.15 
                                                     
12 Cluster Management Guidelines, OCHA, approved by the Cluster Head Meeting, 28 November 2005. 
13 http://www.un.org.pk/undp/docs/South-Asia-FlashAppeal-2005-Earthquake-Update-26October20051.pdf 
14 Ibid. 
15 http://www.erra.gov.pk/Reports/Donor.pdf 
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International NGOs 
The international NGO community reacted immediately to the earthquake and hundreds of 
international organisations have taken part in the relief operation in various ways. Organisations 
already present in Pakistan immediately diverted their activities to the earthquake relief. 
The Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF), an INGO body including Plan, Oxfam, Concern, Care, 
SRS, Islamic Relief, Church World Service and Save the Children, was established in 2001. The 
PHF met on 8 October to discuss the response and divided the affected areas between the INGOs. 
The majority of the INGOs worked through or in collaboration with local NGOs in the early phase 
of the relief operation; the ICRC and national societies collaborated with the Pakistani Red Crescent 
Society. Because of well established relationships, this enabled the INGOs to reach out rapidly to a 
number of smaller organisations. Through its local partners PHF was able to conduct rapid 
assessments on 9 October and to start search, rescue and relief work within the first 24 hours. 
f. Norwegian assistance, policy and response 
The Norwegian MFA 
The MFA responded to the earthquake by releasing NOK 15 million on 9 October and NOK 50 
million on 14 October 2005.16 The first round of funds went primarily to Norwegian NGOs with a 
presence in Pakistan, to Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap (DSB) for the 
establishment of camps for relief workers, and to various UN agencies. Funding was also allocated 
for initiatives taken by the Pakistani diaspora. Moreover, funds of NOK 5 million were assigned to 
the Norwegian Embassy in Islamabad and NORAD for smaller initiatives and projects. 
 
Once the scale of the disaster was known, NOK 260 million in extra budgetary funds were granted 
by the Storting.17 This second round of funding was specifically channelled through the UN with the 
aim of coordinating relief efforts through the UN’s Organisation for Humanitarian Assistance. This 
was justified by the, at the time, relatively small contributions from the international community to 
the UN extended appeal of almost USD 550 million. According to the embassy, the Norwegian 
contribution of USD 53, 821,780 towards the UN flash appeal amounted to 25% of the total pledges 
made by the international community at the time.  
 
The MFA made a policy decision to prioritise and support hospitals and staff from the Norwegian 
Red Cross, rather than the field hospital suggested by the Norwegian Army. NATO received some 
support for the transport of relief goods into Pakistan, and in fact the first flights of what NATO 
referred to as the air-bridge were funded by Norway. Moreover, the MFA set as a requirement that, 
in order to be supported, NGOs should have a documented presence and/or networks in Pakistan, 
previous experience in the provision of emergency assistance, and they should be active participants 
in clusters in Islamabad or in the field. With regard to the second grant from the Storting, following 
a change of Government in Norway, a policy decision was made to channel all support through UN 
agencies in support of the cluster approach. 
The Norwegian NGO response 
Norwegian NGOs engaged in humanitarian activities responded to the earthquake immediately. The 
Norwegian Red Cross, NRC, NCA, Plan, and Save the Children all issued public appeals, and 
started their humanitarian operations immediately. Except for NRC, which had its own staff in the 
                                                     
16 According to information received from the MFA. 
17 Whitepaper No. 9 - dated 25 October 2005. 
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field, the groups had a policy of working through local networks or partner organisations in the field 
in the initial phase. This was later supplemented by Norwegian staff, either as experts or in support 
of the national organisations. The NRC’s Emergency Standby Force (funded by MFA) was heavily 
drawn on to increase the UN and IOM response capacity. Likewise, DSB had Norwegian teams to 
man the camps established for housing the relief community.  
 
The Norwegian NGOs received approximately 20% of the total funding from the MFA. The major 
Norwegian organisations (such as NRC and NCA) have, however, raised considerably higher 
amounts through public appeals, the Norwegian private sector and from other countries’ 
development agencies, such as the UK Department for International Development (DfID) and the 
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Organisation (ECHO). 
g. Conclusion 
The earthquake is one of the largest catastrophes to have hit Pakistan, and despite knowledge of its 
vulnerability to earthquakes and efforts made by UNDP to establish a Crisis Prevention and 
Reconstruction framework, such plans and organisations were still absent at national and provincial 
levels when the disaster struck. 
 
The Pakistani and international actors did a tremendous job in meeting the needs of the earthquake 
victims. And despite chaos in the early stages, the slowness of the UN to get the cluster approach in 
operation beyond Islamabad and the initially low response from the donor community, the relief 
operation is to be regarded as a success. Three important contributing factors towards that end were 
the involvement of Pakistani NGOs/civil society and the Pakistani Army, and, not least, the fact that 
the winter of 2005/06 was for the most part much milder and with less snow than normal. 
 
Norway was one of the largest contributors to the relief operation, politically, financially and as a 
lead nation in support of the UN cluster approach. The high Norwegian profile in Pakistan, at Prime 
Minister and Minister of International Development level, and the field engagement of the 
Norwegian Embassy, made the Norwegian involvement and contribution visible well beyond 
Islamabad circles.      
 
CMI REPORT REVIEW OF NORWEGIAN EARTHQUAKE ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN R 2006: 18 
 10 
3. General assistance assessment 
a. The Pakistani mobilisation 
The earthquake saw a phenomenal national response. Once news of the disaster spread, the 
Pakistani public (both individuals and organisations), rapidly mobilised trucks of food, blankets and 
clothes. This spontaneous public response was the first to reach the affected areas. Lack of 
information about the situation, however, resulted in initial confusion.  Uncoordinated initiatives 
and blocked roads caused traffic jams, slowing down the response and making it more difficult to 
reach areas off the main roads. Despite the initial disorder the speed and scale of the public response 
was crucial in saving lives over the first few days. While this response was uncoordinated and 
therefore less effective than it could have been, the magnitude of the response shows the potential 
resting in a better coordinated civilian response.   
 
More effective and better coordinated were local NGOs already working in the affected areas. 
These were in a position to respond to the earthquake through their networks of local community-
based organisations, which enabled an immediate response, well before the international community 
and the UN became operational in the affected areas. 
 
The relief response included every type of organisation, including religious ones; among these were 
some linked to ‘jihadi’ organisations featuring on the UNSC terrorist list.18 A recent ICG report 
estimates that religious organisations linked to proscribed groups mobilised volunteers from all over 
the country.19 Based on observations from people working in the field these organisations appeared 
as relatively well organised and had the ability to mobilise volunteers and resources early. It is 
likely that they already had some presence in the high-lying areas close to the LoC, and that they 
therefore were ready to provide manual labour and moral support in the very first hours and days of 
the crisis. They were apparently also able draw on professional expertise, as it was reported that 
health personnel for camps had been recruited from Lahore. Talking to members of the international 
community working in the field, the general impression is that these organisations, like other 
humanitarian organisations (of various ideologies and denominations), worked to provide relief to 
the earthquake victims as fast and effectively as possible. A concern was noted regarding threats 
posed towards the employment of female relief staff. 
 
The government/army did not obstruct anyone from helping, including the religious organisations 
linked to the ‘jihadi’ groups. Several of the UN officials interviewed pointed out that to ban Islamic 
groups from helping would have been difficult from a humanitarian perspective as well as 
politically, as foreign forces were allowed to assist. And, as was emphasised by the Humanitarian 
Coordinator: the UN did not provide any assistance for these groups. One should not underestimate, 
however, the potential for ideological and political gains that these organisations may have made. It 
is the Government of Pakistan’s responsibility to follow up on this and ensure that proscribed 
groups do not capitalise on the disaster, and that long-term service provision is overseen and 
controlled by the GoP. A ban on single organisations, in such a highly volatile political context, 
would probably only led them to change their names and logos and possibly caused animosity 
towards ‘western’ NGOs and the UN.    
                                                     
18 To examine the role of jihadi organisations in the earthquake response is outside the scope of this assessment. As these 
organisations have received attention from the press and caused debate within the international community, we have 
decided to include our preliminary observations in the section discussing the national response.  
19 International Crisis Group, Asia Brief No. 46 Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake (March 2006). 
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b. The role of the army 
The Pakistani Army was rapidly mobilised and two divisions were dispatched to the affected areas, 
where it established forward base camps and mobilised troops, helicopters, vehicles, donkeys and 
mules to transport relief items up the valleys and take injured people down. While the civilian 
administration was severely incapacitated and the NGOs had their headquarters in nearby urban 
centres (such as Mansehra, Abbottabad and Muzaffarabad), the army was on the ground from day 
one. It took the lead in coordination and provided logistical support and security. The army opened 
up areas previously inaccessible to civilians and shared its maps, bases and storage spaces, as well 
as transportation.  
 
The military also established and managed several refugee camps. They had the order and 
manpower required to clear land and set up camps rapidly. UNHCR, NRC and other NGOs trained 
the military in understanding the difference between humanitarian and military camps. The 
logistical capacity of the military was critical, and the army seems to have been willing to learn, 
encouraged by officers with experience of international operations. 
 
The army has been criticised by the ICG for being unprepared to respond to a natural disaster and 
more concerned with security and military casualties than with taking part in the relief work during 
the first few days. That might, however, be explained by the general degree of confusion that 
existed in the early stages of the relief operation and the humanitarian and material losses suffered 
by the army in the affected areas.   
 
While the role of the army in the relief phase has been criticised by a number of non-governmental 
actors, the majority of these – and particularly those working on the ground in the field – 
acknowledge that the army, although its performance was less than perfect, did a job no one else 
had the capacity to do at the time, and that they did it well. Moreover, considering the role of the 
Pakistani army in the country since independence, it seems the Pakistani public expected a military 
response and that this was viewed by most not only as natural, but critical to the success of the 
overall relief operation, and as fair and efficient. 
c. From relief to rehabilitation, from army to civilian administration 
While the government responded promptly, nobody in the civilian administration had the capacity 
to deal with a disaster of this magnitude. The ongoing transition from relief to rehabilitation, 
however, ought to include a transition from military control to civilian leadership and 
implementation. While the army is handing over responsibilities to civilian bodies, it seems that 
these are at present heavily influenced by military personnel.  This remains a significant challenge. 
 
In view of Norway’s earlier focus on good governance and devolution in its development assistance 
to Pakistan, supporting the transition to civilian-led rehabilitation and reconstruction and assisting 
the civilian administration and civil society organisations’ ability to respond effectively in future 
disasters would be a natural next step and one that would contribute to furthering long-term 
development goals.  
d. Return dilemmas and local context challenges 
The GoP declared 31 March 2006 the end of the relief phase and decided that registered camps 
would close on this date. This initiated a drive to return people to their places of origin, particularly 
in NWFP, where the army has closed all but a few residual camps. In AJK the policy on camp 
closure has been less strict than in NWFP and no operational deadline has been applied. And 
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whereas food delivery in the camps was stopped on 31 March, water/sanitation and health services 
are still provided.  
 
With approximately 400,000 destroyed and damaged houses (later revised to 600,000), many issues 
still remain unresolved and will affect peoples’ decisions and ability to return. While the GoP’s 
housing reconstruction policy provides for a financial compensation package, this only applies to 
landowners or tenants who get a NOC from the owner to reconstruct. As a considerable number of 
the affected people lived on leased land without proper agreements, many questions have risen 
regarding compensation and the fate of tenants without the consent of the landowner to rebuild. 
Another unresolved issue is the relocation of communities lying on the seismic fault line.   
 
Overall, the return process has been marked by weak advance planning and a lack of information to 
the returnees. The return has therefore come as a surprise and has increased uncertainty for many. 
While many people have started moving back to their homes, others have left registered camps and 
settled in new spontaneous camps elsewhere. It is still too early to estimate the numbers that will 
actually return, as affected people are considering their various options. 
 
The GoP recognises that not everyone is in a position to return to their place of origin and a few 
‘residual camps’ will remain open to provide security for vulnerable groups with shelter for the 
winter. Currently, vulnerable groups include those who have nothing to return to (because of 
landslides) and those who need care and have no one to take care of them. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether the residual camps are sufficient to take care of those who decide to stay, and 
those who might decide to move down-country again when next winter arrives. 
e. The cluster approach 
The new UN cluster approach was still under debate in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) initiated by the Humanitarian Reform Review (HRR) when the earthquake hit Pakistan.20 
Although the cluster concept was not fully developed a decision was made to run a pilot in Pakistan 
to test it.  
 
A total of 11 clusters were established in Pakistan, plus overall cluster coordination under OCHA 
direction, with UNICEF heading three clusters (protection, education and water/sanitation), WFP 
likewise (nutrition, IT/communication and logistics), while the following agencies each headed one 
cluster: FAO (livelihoods sub-cluster), IOM (emergency shelter), UNHCR (camp management – 
camps of over 50 tents), UNDP (early recovery and reconstruction) and WHO (health). While all 
the agencies, the ICRC and the NGOs interviewed for this review were supportive of the new 
cluster approach, they were equally in agreement on the need for improvements.   
 
All the Norwegian-funded organisations interviewed participated in the cluster system, and it was 
argued that there had therefore been no need for a separate Norwegian coordination mechanism. 
This reasoning seems to have applied to the embassies as well, as no specific donor coordination 
mechanism was established. One NGO argued that a donor coordination forum would have been 
useful to further a more unified dialogue with the GoP.     
 
While the clusters were relatively rapidly established in Islamabad, as were a number of 
humanitarian hubs in four field locations,21 it took much longer for the clusters to become 
                                                     
20 The suggestion for a Lead Agency and cluster response was formulated in ‘Humanitarian Response Review’, an 
Independent Report Commissioned by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator & Under-Secretary for Humanitarian 
Affairs, OCHA of April 2005. 
21 The first Minutes from hub meetings were recorded in Muzaffarabad on 28 October 2005. 
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operational in the field. The quality of coordination differed, though, as a Cluster Update of 
09.11.05 spells out. Only three Islamabad-based clusters had by that time presented their TORs, and 
only two had reported having systematic communication with the field clusters. One explanation 
provided was that the largest agencies, referred to as ‘the big five’, were overstretched, and it was 
suggested by WHO that smaller agencies could have been better suited to work as cluster lead 
agencies.    
 
This illustrates a range of challenges that emerged as the cluster approach was tested in Pakistan. 
One example is the UN agencies’ reluctance to enter into the cluster arrangement and assume lead 
agency responsibility. Possibly they wanted to avoid lending approval to the cluster system, or 
binding the agency with a ‘last resort’ responsibility. Another challenge is the agencies’ lack of 
understanding of and commitment towards the new arrangement. And the third example is the way 
some UN agencies monopolised the Norwegian cluster funding for their own organisation, acting 
against decisions made in Cluster Head Meetings.  
 
Another issue noted on the UN side is where responsibility for monitoring and evaluation should be 
placed – with the lead agency, the cluster or the donor – and what responsibility cluster lead 
agencies hold when they are to be the ‘last resort’. In addition, a number of questions were raised by 
national NGOs, highlighted in a recent report published by Action Aid.22 They include the 
difficulties they faced in contributing to cluster coordination: a lack of invitation in the first 
instance, their limited capacity to attend numerous meetings, the language barrier and their efforts 
not being recognised by the international community.      
Reluctance to assume responsibility 
There are two separate cases to highlight here. UNHCR was, despite its long experience of running 
camps in Pakistan for Afghan refugees, extremely reluctant to assume responsibility for camp 
management. It finally agreed to take responsibility for settlements with more than 50 tents (having 
first said more than 200 tents), which according to NGOs only accounted for about 20 % of the 
displaced. Moreover, they did not wish to recognise the displaced population as Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs), but introduced a new label of Earthquake Displaced Persons (EDPs), 
implying limited rights. In discussion, UNHCR emphasised its need to prioritise refugees over 
internally displaced people. It indicated, moreover, that it, and UNHCR HQ, had not been assured 
that the Norwegian cluster donation for the cluster was ‘fresh’ money and would not be deducted 
from the general contribution to UNHCR. Why it had not sought such clarification was not evident 
to the review team. It appeared more like to be agency reluctance to assume cluster responsibility, 
thereby slowing down the process of establishing a proper camp management system (over 50 
tents).  
 
In the second case the agency, WFP, explicitly stated its reluctance to channel the Norwegian 
funding to members of the Logistics Cluster. In a communication with the MFA the WFP HQ 
explains:  
 
The cluster approach… was not originally conceived as a structure which would be 
responsible for resource mobilization at the country level, but should function as an 
effective tool to provide technical support to the field and build capacity. Existing 
mechanisms such as the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) still remain the 
preferred tool for raising resources for humanitarian action. At this point, we do not 
                                                     
22 Action Aid International (2006), The Evolving UN Cluster Approach in the Aftermath of the Pakistan Earthquake: An 
NGO Perspective, London. 
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wish to set a precedent before the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) agrees 
on further guidance to the field on applying the cluster system at the country level.23   
 
WFP kept the entire funding amount assigned for food through the nutrition cluster (NOK 28.59 
million) and for communication through the IT/communication cluster (NOK 5.6 million). 
Regarding the remainder of the total Norwegian contribution of NOK 102.4 million it initially 
recommended that MFA channel the funding directly to the cluster members, WFP (NOK 42.78 
million), Atlas (NOK 4.75 million), IOM (NOK 6.74 million) and UNOPS (NOK 13.93million), 
rather than to either WFP or the cluster taking on that responsibility. 
 
It is evident that if UN agencies are to assume the role of cluster lead there needs to be a general 
consensus and agreement among them on what such a responsibility implies, and, moreover, 
agreement that agencies might have to go beyond their UN mandate as cluster heads to 
accommodate the needs arising in any particular context. Otherwise the cluster approach will not be 
able to deal with gaps, address properly cross-cutting issues and foster a culture of collaboration 
rather than self-protection and self-funding.     
Understanding and commitment 
Much of the criticism levelled against the clusters relates to the extremely weak cluster 
management, a general lack of understanding of what coordination (and not directing) implies and 
the cluster heads lacking the ability to distinguish between the interests of their own agency and the 
cluster. One of the intentions of the cluster approach was to ensure that agencies with technical 
competence and resources were assigned responsibility for the thematic clusters. However, if 
coordination responsibility is placed with technical staff with an already high workload they are not 
likely to fulfil such a demanding task, as was demonstrated in several clusters. And, while the very 
general TOR developed for the clusters left room for innovation and adaptation to realities on the 
ground, they did not provide sufficient guidance for inexperienced agencies or agency staff.  With 
OCHA assuming more of an advisory and oversight function in this new cluster approach, and with 
staff on very short rotation, it was not in a position to address the weaknesses of single clusters. 
Although the Humanitarian Coordinator indicated that he had used his authority to make changes in 
the clusters and to reduce unrealistic ‘shopping lists’ presented as agency budgets,24 there was no 
overall corrective force in place.    
 
IOM’s role as lead agency for the shelter cluster may, however, serve as an illustration of how 
improvements can be made. Initially the IOM had assigned inexperienced and junior staff to head 
and manage the cluster, leaving other cluster members totally dissatisfied and about to withdraw 
from the cluster. Given the importance of this cluster for the overall relief operation DfID 
intervened by funding and recruiting an experienced consultant to head the cluster. It thereby 
salvaged the process and made the shelter cluster into one of the best rated clusters, even 
capitalising on its ability to draw on the Norwegian cluster funding (see below).           
 
Agencies’ commitment to assuming cluster responsibility provides the following lessons: 
 
• Cluster coordination is a demanding task that requires dedicated and experienced agency 
staff, trained in process and programme management and with a general understanding of 
what inter-agency (beyond the UN) coordination and collaboration implies. 
                                                     
23 WFP Donor Relations Officer, e-mail communication of 16 December 2005.  
24 In one instance, budget reduction, for an agency with limited implementation capacity, had been revoked in the UN 
agency HQ before the budget was submitted to the donors. 
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• A system for the training of cluster coordinators is required, to be offered for each lead 
agency, OCHA dedicated coordinators, ICRC and NGO staff and senior personnel in the 
NRC’s secondment system (and for governments in disaster prone countries). This would 
ensure that such skills are held among the broadest possible range of actors to reduce 
vulnerability. 
• Cluster agencies should be allowed to charge a certain percentage for cluster coordination, 
although along clearly defined budget lines, to ensure that experienced and dedicated staff 
members are designated and allowed the time needed for cluster leadership and 
management.  
 
It is urgent that such a training component is developed, and that agencies ensure that senior and 
experienced staff members are prioritised for training. 
Monopolising cluster funding 
Norwegian willingness to provide direct funding for the clusters, channelled through UN agencies, 
helped raise a range of important issues for the further development of the cluster approach. A UN 
Head of Agency summarised what appeared to be an opinion held by several agencies: ‘…we were 
not prepared for a system of direct cluster funding’. One concern seems to stem from agency 
organisational formalities for funds transfer, or possibly being unwilling to sidestep such 
formalities. As IOM is not recognised as a UN agency, the funding for the shelter cluster was 
transferred through the UNDP. This prolongs the grant and reporting process as both the IOM and 
the UNDP check the incoming reports from the project implementing agencies and issue their own 
narrative and financial reports.      
 
Moreover, the procedure by which the cluster funding was introduced to the agencies and the Heads 
of Cluster did not contribute constructively to the process. Following initial discussions with the 
Norwegian authorities, Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland informed all Heads of Cluster 
and the Humanitarian Coordinator that Norway had committed itself to funding the clusters with 
NOK 260 million, requesting these to start a fund allocation process. The embassy in Islamabad was 
at that time not informed about the decision, and UN agencies became impatient as they had 
expected a rapid utilisation of funding. Moreover, Stortingsproposisjon nr. 9 (2005-2006) did not 
specifically mention the clusters, stating rather that funding was to be channelled through UN 
agencies and spent in accordance with priorities set by the UN. This left the MFA, the Norwegian 
Embassy in Islamabad and the Humanitarian Coordinator with limited leverage over single UN 
agencies to ensure fund distribution within the clusters. This led to several incidents where the 
agencies monopolised funding, applied mechanisms that protected agency interests (as in 
procurement) and went against decisions made by the Head of Cluster meetings.  
 
In discussions with the UNICEF management team they stated their reluctance to distribute 
Norwegian cluster funding to implementers, as UNICEF was the agency to be held accountable for 
project implementation. Such a statement is contested by other agencies, which argue that NGO 
subcontracting is really nothing new. UNICEF (and other UN agencies) could have applied exactly 
the same procedures as when handling umbrella grants or subcontracting projects to NGOs, as is 
normally done in all of their operations. 
 
The UNICEF approach in the two cases below illustrates different aspects. The first concerns the 
UNICEF-led protection cluster, where in the documents prepared by OCHA, and approved by the 
Head of Cluster meeting in Islamabad, a total of NOK 1 million was allocated for the protection 
work of IOM (0.6 million) and NRC (0.4 million). Despite these instructions UNICEF did not wish 
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to grant funds to either of these organisations, even if that could have broadened the protection 
perspective beyond the child protection focus that is within UNICEF’s mandate. 
 
The second case is presented by Norwegian Church Aid, which made initial contact with UNICEF 
for a water and sanitation project when the Norwegian cluster funding was announced. By mid-
December 2005, NCA had submitted a concept paper to the cluster, but questioning the progress in 
January 2006 it was told to submit a full proposal following UNICEF standards. That being done, it 
was given a verbal reply that the proposal would be funded. However, when no formal reply had 
been provided by April 2006 it contacted UNICEF and was informed that NCA would not be 
allowed to purchase the equipment included in the proposal. Such purchases would be handled 
through UNICEF’s regular procurement service, with a handling time of four to six months. In 
effect, funding that should have been available in December 2005 (when the Norwegian 
preparedness stock could have been made use of) and could have made a difference in the camps at 
that time, can at the earliest be utilised by early September (possibly December) 2006, if the 
proposal were approved in early May. This was not only a totally meaningless postponement of 
assistance provision; the procurement monopolisation might also, beyond a single agency’s wish to 
utilise funding through its own channels, illustrate UNICEF’s inability to provide a rapid response. 
   
As a contrast to UNICEF’s and other UN agencies’ procedures stands IOM’s handling of cluster 
funding. When trusted with Norwegian funding (albeit through UNDP) the shelter cluster 
announced a bidding process, and established a separate committee (by draw at the cluster meeting) 
to review the incoming project proposals. Agencies submitted their proposals fairly quickly, the 
bidding committee prioritised and approved a number of proposals, the cluster was informed of the 
decision and funding was released to the implementing agencies. IOM monitored the 
implementation, each agency submitted its reports to IOM and the cluster, and then further to 
UNDP. According to IOM, the process had gone very smoothly, and had been regarded as 
transparent and effective by members of the shelter cluster. UNDP, however, criticised the reporting 
of some of IOM’s implementing agencies, and stressed that this arrangement was not ideal as it was 
UNDP that was ultimately responsible to the donors. 
Further lessons learnt 
Continuing some further reflections on the cluster approach applied in sudden natural disasters such 
as the Pakistani earthquake, there are five further findings to be highlighted.  
 
One finding is that there is still a need for rapidly released and direct funding for NGOs, including 
national ones, the ICRC and IFRC, in the early stages of a sudden emergency, in order to save lives. 
Even when the UN Emergency Response Fund is in place the UN system is not likely either to have 
sufficient country response capacity or to get funding (and resources) out quickly enough to meet 
immediate needs. Reliance on such a UN-administered emergency fund might actually be a threat to 
the early lifesaving operation, and should only be seen as complementary to the direct and 
multifaceted civil society, national government, NGO, IGO and nationally based UN agency 
response. 
 
Secondly, and in line with the above, direct cluster funding (beyond support for cluster 
coordination) is not appropriate for the first stage of this type of sudden emergency. The clusters 
need time to get organised, to make initial needs assessments, identify gaps and reach a common 
understanding of the situation before they are in a position to allocate funds among cluster agencies 
or enter into bidding processes. 
 
Thus, cluster funding for projects should only be released when the cluster has prepared its first 
consolidated needs and gaps assessment, thereby having documented that there is a functional 
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cluster structure in place. This can, on the one hand, encourage a more rapid establishment and 
initiation of clusters, and, on the other hand, avoid the waste of funding clusters that do not have 
clearly defined needs to meet. 
 
Thirdly, while the ICRC and the Norwegian Red Cross are supportive of the cluster approach and 
attended cluster meetings, they argue strongly for an independent position based on the Geneva 
Convention. This implies, according to the Norwegian Red Cross, that they will refuse to be 
coordinated by a UN agency, receive funding through a cluster led by a UN agency (due to possible 
political strings) or assume the role of cluster head. While, arguably, the ICRC can invoke its 
independence as set by the Geneva Convention, there appear to be no formal arguments for 
National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, such as the Norwegian Red Cross, which is a 
Norwegian NGO, and even the International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, to do so.  
Rather, they should be in a position to take on a more active role in the clusters, including heading 
them, and accept funding through a cluster lead agency. This should ensure that the most competent 
and experienced agency, which in many cases might not be a UN agency, is chosen to lead the 
clusters.   
 
Fourthly, the role of national governments, when existing and functional, within the clusters needs 
to be clarified to avoid unnecessary tension and conflict. In the Pakistani case the government (and 
the army) established a separate organisation that mirrored the UN-led clusters, although they were 
invited in as deputy cluster heads. While, as some NGOs argued, this arrangement allowed them to 
pressurise the government, it was felt by others that they could more easily evade responsibility and 
blame the international community for any shortcomings.   
 
And fifthly, and on a more positive note, the cluster approach might be a very useful mechanism to 
combat corruption in massive emergency responses, which is a highly likely occurrence. The 
example presented is from procurement of shelter material, more specifically, the metal sheets used 
for emergency shelter roofs. As it was recognised that agencies had used very different qualities and 
paid very different prices for the sheets and the transport, the shelter cluster assigned a technical 
working group to the problem. Based on information gathered from cluster members the working 
group was able then to recommend a standard quality and maximum purchase and transport price 
for all member agencies, thus limiting the possibility for corruption in the purchase of one of the 
main relief items.    
Conclusion on cluster approach 
The general conclusion is that the cluster approach should be taken further, but clarifications and 
improvements are needed on a range of issues, the most important being: 
 
• Experiences from the Pakistani cluster approach need to be brought up for debate to 
identify areas of necessary improvement. The views of the Government of Pakistan, donors, 
UN agencies, and inter- and non-governmental organisations (national and international) 
need to be solicited. 
• Norway needs to review the appropriateness of direct cluster funding. If it is to be 
continued, further discussions are required with OCHA and UN agencies on funding 
modalities and how rapid disbursement, transparent funding and transfer mechanisms (free 
of charge) within the cluster can be organised, with an agreement on monitoring and 
reporting responsibility towards donors. 
• Likewise, the timing of the cluster funding needs to be reviewed. It appears that the system 
of direct and rapid funding of NGOs and INGOs with local networks should be prioritised 
for the immediate life-saving phase. Cluster lead agencies should receive financial support 
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for the establishment of the cluster structure, while direct funding through the clusters 
should only be released when the clusters are firmly established and needs identified and 
prioritised.  
• The appointment of cluster agencies and heads is an import issue for clarification. One UN 
agency should not hold responsibility for a large number of clusters, and there should be an 
opening for appointing a non-UN lead agency when these, either an inter- or non-
governmental agency, have the necessary country experience and organisational 
management capacity. 
• Training of cluster heads should be a priority and immediately initiated, emphasising 
voluntary and facilitated coordination to ensure the broadest possible inclusion in the 
clusters. 
f. Conclusion 
The response to the Pakistani earthquake underlines the importance of local organisations that can 
provide an immediate response, and international donors that can quickly provide or assure funding. 
International NGOs with local partner organisations and UN agencies with local networks can then 
utilise these for a rapid response.  
 
In a country such as Pakistan with an internationally recognised government, that government needs 
to be included rather than bypassed by the international actors. While the GoP was extremely 
supportive in issuing visas for relief staff and allowing the rapid handling of relief goods, the 
international aid coordination structure was established in parallel to national agencies.  
  
The cluster approach, however, both proved its usefulness and exposed its weaknesses. A further 
debate is required to improve the approach, including discussions between Norwegian MFA, 
OCHA and UN agencies on the organisational handling of cluster funding to and between agencies 
and organisations, as well as ways to monitor and report.  
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4. Thematic issues 
a. Disaster preparedness 
The Government of Pakistan’s disaster preparedness is generally weak and no civilian authority is 
geared to respond to a disaster of this magnitude. As previously mentioned, a national crisis 
prevention and recovery framework was developed in 2002. This initiative was not taken further 
and while it advised the need for a national plan, no steps were taken to start this process and the 
government ended up badly unprepared to tackle a disaster of this size and to coordinate an 
effective response. No early warning system was in place and only limited attention was paid to 
environmental issues that could limit the harm of future quakes. 
 
The earthquake clearly demonstrated the need to build capacity in preparedness and response, both 
at the national level and among communities:  
 
• The national level: While the national response was immediate and considerable resources 
were mobilised by the army, the capacity of the civilian administration was weak.  While 
the lack of capacity could be used as an argument in favour of heavy military engagement, 
strengthening the ability and competence of the civilian administration to respond to 
disasters is a means to further democratic governance. 
• Civil society: National and particularly local NGOs were the first to react in a systematic 
manner to the earthquake. With their established networks and contacts in villages through 
local-level NGOs and community-based organisations, they demonstrated the ability to 
respond rapidly and get information and assessments from areas cut off from the main 
roads.  
• Community level: The experience from the earthquake shows that it is the communities – 
and women in particular – that are the ones that need to deal with the immediate relief 
work. Experience from community-based disaster preparedness committees has 
demonstrated that the value of community involvement is crucial. Further, as more than 
18,000 students and 800 teachers and staff were killed in the disaster, basic training and 
drilling of teachers and students could contribute towards saving thousands of lives.  
b. Gender 
While nobody knows exactly how the earthquake has affected women, the disaster has been far 
from gender neutral. Women were in general harder hit by the earthquake and faced more hardship 
during the relief phase. While no systematic survey has been carried out segregating the effects by 
gender, we know that more female teachers were killed than male (approx. 60% female, 40% male). 
It is also likely that due to work migration patterns, with men working in other places in Pakistani 
urban centres or abroad, more women than men died and suffered severe injuries, and many women 
were left to cope with the immediate effects of the earthquake. Further, it seems women have been 
worse off in the relief phase. This applies particularly to widows, who, due to existing cultural 
norms, were unable to move to camps, or who, when in camps, were confined to the tents; they 
could not stand in line to get registered, present their claims, or use public facilities. These women 
became passive recipients, having to wait to be visited in their villages or tents. While it is likely 
that many women have suffered from neglect, no reports have been made of women that have been 
completely abandoned. Nor does it seem that physical violence against women has occurred in any 
major or systematic way, and only a few, scattered reports have been received.  
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In accordance with the IASC cluster concept, gender was treated as a cross-cutting theme and was 
supposed to be a component in the work of all the clusters. More than six months on, however, little 
has been done to address gender issues as a cross-cutting theme in the clusters. UNFPA was the 
only agency that focused its relief work specifically on gender and was responsible for the Gender 
Task Force, a sub-cluster under the health cluster. Many decisions have been taken at the Head of 
Cluster meetings, where there is no gender representation/focal point, and of which the UNFPA 
Gender Task Force is not part.  
 
The overall relief work has thus not addressed gender issues, or women’s needs, in any systematic 
way. The main challenges seem to be related to UN and other actors being too busy with their own 
work, paying little attention to the importance of mainstreaming gender throughout the relief phase.  
 
UNFPA addressed its gender concerns to the UN Secretary General during his visit, and he brought 
it up with high-level Pakistani authorities. While there is no problem in getting commitments for 
these concerns at the top level in the UN and the GoP, the challenge remains to get acceptance, 
understanding and a practical implementation of action at the lower levels. 
 
Existing cultural norms in the earthquake-affected areas, and in Pakistan in general, make gender 
sensitivity a challenge more generally. In the field, many organisations report difficulties recruiting 
female staff and recognise that without them they are unable to gain access to women. This 
demonstrates the need to ensure that issues related to female recruitment (such as conditions and 
facilities for female staff) are taken into consideration in the planning phase and that sufficient 
resources are put aside for this. It also proves the need to have gender sensitisation - in very 
concrete terms - included in humanitarian training of management and field workers from the UN, 
the government, the army, NGOs and volunteers. 
 
A UNFPA gender advisor has been seconded to ERRA to assist in redrafting the National Plan of 
Action for Protection (drafted by the Ministry of Social Welfare). ERRA, however, seems to be 
focusing on the vulnerability aspect of protection, and less on gender issues.  Whereas its capacity is 
weak, it is, according to UNFPA, open to taking advice. A gender advisor will also be based in the 
UN Humanitarian Coordinator’s office. Albeit coming late, this provides an opportunity to 
mainstream gender in the various clusters in the rehabilitation phase.  
Conclusion 
Treating gender as a cross-cutting theme has resulted in no one taking gender seriously. The UN 
needs to ensure gender mainstreaming through the use of focal points in high-level meetings, make 
targeted gender intervention a standard in programmes, and ensure that staff at both managerial and 
implementation levels are trained in how practically to ensure gender equality in relief work. There 
is an opportunity for Norway to follow up gender concerns in the rehabilitation phase and in future 
disaster preparedness. 
c. Learning from previous disasters 
While, arguably, each emergency will have its special features, there is a degree of commonality to 
draw on from previous experiences.  Those appearing least able to draw on past experiences in the 
initial phases were the Government of Pakistan and parts of the UN system, influenced by 
uncertainty as to what the new cluster approach would entail.  
 
The national NGOs explicitly cited their past experiences of responding to a broad array of 
emergency types, and from working with other NGOs, local authorities and the communities. 
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Likewise, international NGOs with local partner organisations could draw on this expertise and add 
in their own experiences. Others provided their standard emergency response packages, such as 
hospitals, staff camps or water equipment, which have been tested in a number of previous 
emergencies.    
 
This emergency provided a number of opportunities to learn from operations at high altitude and 
with extremely difficult access throughout the winter, and, certainly, from how the clusters 
approach was operationalised. 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 2: Large areas were destroyed by landslides, including roads.  
(Photo: Hugo B. Ark (IOM))  
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5. Norwegian assistance  
a. Organisational overview, types of activity 
Of the total funding of NOK 522,056,529, NOK 390,080,000, or approx. 72 %, was channelled 
through UN organisations. NOK 103,420,713, or approx. 21 %, was provided to NGOs, 
predominantly the Norwegian Red Cross (including assistance channelled to ICRC and IFRC), 
which received NOK 60,000,000 or 11.4%, and other Norwegian NGOs, which received 
approximately 8.7 %. Local Pakistani NGOs received NOK 5,000,000, or 0.9 %. The remainder 
was divided between the DSB, Norad, KRD and FD (5 %), and NATO (2 %). For details see Annex 
III. 
 
Funding Distribution
72 %
2 %
21 %
5 % UN 
NATO
NGOs
DSB, FD, KRD &
NORAD
 
 
 
The first batch of Norwegian funding (through October) went to local and Norwegian NGOs with a 
presence on the ground. The second batch of funding (November 2005) went mainly to UN 
agencies. The reason for prioritising funding through the UN was, according to the MFA, i) the new 
government’s priority to fund UN agencies and support UN reform, and ii) the speed with which the 
MFA can process funding proposals and reporting. 
b. Overview of the organisations funded  
Given the review team’s time limitation a representative number of UN agencies and NGOs were 
selected for interviews and closer examination, leaving out agencies and organisations that either 
had minimal involvement or only received limited Norwegian support.  
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UN Agencies 
OCHA - OCHA was in place within 24 hours with a UNDAC team, and established a coordination 
office in Islamabad. Hub offices were gradually established in Bagh, Batagram, Mansehra and 
Muzaffarabad, and OCHA assumed overall responsibility for cluster coordination 
     
UNDP - Cluster lead for Early Recovery.  
The recovery cluster prepared an early recovery plan to bridge the relief phase and the 
reconstruction phase. UNDP also implemented shelter and heating projects and provided capacity 
building assistance to ERRA. 
 
The Norwegian grant for the IOM-led shelter cluster was channelled through UNDP.  
 
IOM - Cluster lead for Shelter. 
Main activities: Shelter, logistics and camp management of spontaneous camps. IOM was also lead 
agency on all non-food logistics and transported tents, blankets and equipment for subcontracting 
partners. 
 
UNHAS – was instrumental in transport of relief supplies and relief workers, a well organised 
helicopter service allowed supplied to be shipped into remote and high altitude areas. 
 
UNHCR - Cluster lead for Camp Management. 
UNHCR’s mandate includes complex emergencies and IDPs in conflict-related natural disasters, 
but not in pure natural disasters. Given UNHCR’s experience, it also supported UNICEF and 
UNHRC in their protection mandates. 
 
UNICEF - Cluster lead for Education, Protection and WATSAN clusters. 
UNICEF’s child orientation led to an emphasis on immunisation against measles (1 million children 
vaccinated), water treatment and sanitation to reduce diarrhoea, and winter clothing against 
respiratory infections. The agency is of the opinion that it helped prevent massive deaths, and they 
argue that Norwegian water purification equipment was essential in supplying safe water.  
 
UNICEF focused its efforts on clothing distribution (to 700,000 children); the distribution of 
winterisation kits; providing wat/san in the camps; the vaccination of children to prevent epidemics; 
continuing children’s schooling through schools in the camps; and the protection of vulnerable 
groups such as women, children and the disabled. 
 
As noted above, UNICEF did not distribute Norwegian-assigned cluster funding among cluster 
agencies in the three clusters they headed. UNICEF was not in a position to provide information on 
the allocation of Norwegian funding at the time of the review.  
 
WFP - Cluster lead for the Nutrition, IT/communication and Logistics clusters.  
Food distribution and logistics were the WFP’s main activity, but it was also involved in providing 
field accommodation for UN agencies and other assistance providers, utilising DSB and other 
national civil defence organisations. 
 
WHO - Cluster lead for Health; limited Norwegian funding.  
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NGOs 
Caritas 
Caritas Norway divided Norwegian assistance between its national partners in Pakistan and India, 
whereas the team reviewed only the relief efforts of Caritas Pakistan. According to Caritas, its 
teams reached the earthquake-affected areas on 9 October and carried out initial assessments. 
Caritas started immediate distribution of tents and blankets; later this was supplemented with non-
food item distribution and health care. Caritas Pakistan concentrated its work on two union councils 
as well as earthquake-affected families living in host families around Mansehra. 
 
Caritas Pakistan is a member of the Caritas International network, which immediately responded by 
sending an Emergency Response Support Team to Pakistan to help Caritas Pakistan develop a 
Special Operations Appeal (SOA). The SOA outlines a three-year programme, comprising an initial 
six-month emergency phase followed by plans for longer-term livelihood rehabilitation and housing 
reconstruction.  
Norwegian Red Cross, ICRC and IFRC 
The Norwegian Red Cross has primarily been involved in the disaster response through supporting 
the ICRC and IFRC operations by contributing funding, emergency relief items (such as winterised 
tents, sleeping bags and blankets) and Red Cross delegates. The ICRC and IFRC divided the work 
between the organisations in accordance with the Seville agreement, which defines issues of 
leadership in missions: in disasters IFRC takes the lead, while in conflict areas ICRC leads the 
operation, making ICRC responsible for AJK and IFRC for NWFP. It is noteworthy that the 
Pakistani Red Crescent Society (PRSC), IFRC and ICRC spoke with one voice (represented by 
Halvor Fossum Lauritzen) in the initial phase of the cluster development. 
 
ICRC was already present in Pakistan before the earthquake. It scaled up its operation, focusing on 
shelter, food, health, and tracing missing persons. IFRC, working in collaboration with the Pakistani 
Red Crescent Society, distributed relief supplies, started the reconstruction of destroyed 
infrastructure and provided health services.  
 
On 21 October the Norwegian Red Cross established its first field hospitals in Muzaffarabad 
(jointly with the Finish Red Cross). It also contributed delegates to a field hospital in Abbottabad. 
46 terrain vehicles were transported from Norway to assist in the distribution of food, medicines, 
and other emergency supplies to inaccessible areas. According to ICRC, the Red Cross operations 
have been responsible for about 20% of the total food distribution.  
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) 
Norwegian Church Aid worked through its locally based partner Church World Service (CWS), and 
seconded Norwegian administrators and technical expertise (for example in water and sanitation) to 
strengthen its operational and technical capability. Having built up networks in the field over the 
last decade, CWS started its work on 9 October. CWS/NCA had Recovery and Monitoring and 
Assessment (RAM) teams in operation to do needs assessments, collect data and to verify 
information provided by the army. They started to work out of Balakot in the fields of psychosocial 
services, wat/san, health/hygiene and the provision of tents.  
 
By working with Action by Churches Together (ACT) International, a global alliance of churches 
and related agencies, NCA was in a position to draw on local as well as global partners.  
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Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) 
NRC was engaged in emergency and transitional shelter distribution, camp management (of 
spontaneous camps, less than 50 tents), protection (through the ICLA programme), camp 
management training, winter survival training and emergency education. 
 
NRC has been present in Pakistan since 2001 with its assistance to the Afghan refugee programme. 
NRC did the first assessment on 9 October and quickly made the decision to focus its effort on the 
most remote areas that were difficult to access and to procure tents locally. This enabled a rapid 
response and initiation of emergency shelter distribution on 21 October.  
Realising the lack of coordination for the management of spontaneous camps, NRC took on this 
task together with IOM. NRC has provided training on camp management to the army and to NGOs 
running camps funded through UNHCR.  
 
The emergency shelter programme was soon transformed into a transitional shelter programme to 
provide winterised shelters for households settled above the snow line. NRC collaborated in the 
UN-launched ‘operation winter race’, and worked closely with both IOM and the Pakistani Army to 
reach high-lying, remote settlements. 
 
NRC’s existing Information, Counselling and Legal Aid (ICLA) programme, targeting Afghan 
returnees, was expanded to the earthquake area to deal with cases related to compensation for loss 
of life, disability and shelter. In April 2006 some 1200-1300 new cases were registered daily, 
responding to earthquake victims’ needs for information about compensation rights and processes. 
Plan Pakistan 
Plan Norway channelled its support through Plan Pakistan, having worked in Mansehra since 1997. 
It was working in 52 villages when the earthquake hit, which enabled a rapid response. Plan 
assumed a coordination role for sending volunteers to the areas where it worked. Plan coordinated 
and assisted the distribution of relief goods, including shelter, household and hygiene kits, food and 
clothing, as well as the deployment of volunteer doctors. Plan also started emergency education and 
children’s play spaces in the IDP camps. As a part of Plan International, Plan Pakistan draws on 
resources – both financial and human – from national Plan organisations in 16 resource mobilising 
countries.  
Sungi Development Foundation 
Sungi is a local NGO based in Abbottabad in the NWFP. Through its staff members and community 
contacts Sungi managed to establish a first rapid assessment by the evening of 8 October.  A Joint 
Assistance Committee for Earthquake Relief (JACER) was established in its office, bringing 
together more than 100 national NGOs, enabled by a reallocation of NORAD grants that same day.  
On 9 October 20 NGOs and the government met to plan and divide responsibility. By the evening 
they had managed to compile more detailed information on the situation in five districts, and 
thereby an understanding of the magnitude of the earthquake.  
 
Sungi was established in 1992 as a rights-based development NGO that takes on emergency relief 
operations in the areas in which they work. Sungi works through Community Councils, female and 
male, and has established emergency relief committees in these communities. These are trained in 
rescue, first aid and evacuation. Sungi is a member of Oxfam’s Contingency Planning Consortium 
and was involved in UNDP’s (2003) efforts to build GOP capacity to handle natural disasters.   
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Sungi was involved with the distribution of tent and relief items and transitional shelters and 
water/sanitation, and provided medical assistance through volunteer doctors. Sungi operated with 
180 staff members and 300 volunteers, including teams from other national NGOs, and it ran one-
day orientation training courses for volunteers. Sungi also established a highly regarded information 
centre on the web, which facilitated coordination measures among smaller NGOs. 
c. Aspects of the response and the Norwegian contribution 
Massive logistics operation 
The geography of the affected areas necessitated a massive logistical operation with as many as 125 
helicopters in operation at the time. The Pakistani army, UN, ICRC and NATO created an air bridge 
to take down injured people and to distribute emergency relief items, food, clothing and shelter. 
Helicopters were also used to search systematically for affected settlements not reached by relief 
agencies.  
 
The Norwegian contribution to the NATO Air Bridge was deemed critical in getting it opened and 
accepted. Norwegian support for the logistics cluster has been critical for the implementing partners 
(IOM, ATLAS, UNJLC, UNHAS, UNOPS and WFP) in distributing relief items and being able to 
provide logistical services to other agencies.  
Protection  
Protection was a contested issue as UNHCR initially opted to avoid giving IDP status and instead 
applied the term Earthquake Displaced People (EDP). This would have reduced the protection 
granted the displaced in accordance with the Guiding Principles for IDP protection. NGOs 
(including NRC) put pressure on UNHCR and the GoP and the general use of the term EDP was 
avoided. 
 
Despite its long-term experience in IDP protection, UNHCR did not take the lead in the protection 
cluster. NRC seconded a NRC protection expert to the UNHCR to enhance its protection capacity, 
but the expert, according to NRC, was not assigned to work on protection issues. While UNICEF 
has long-term experience in child protection, it was criticised for not taking a broad enough 
approach in the protection cluster and its avoidance of channelling cluster funding to IOM and NRC 
contributed to this criticism.  
Vulnerable groups - institutionalised care  
Many children lost their parents, and figures of about 15,000 unaccompanied children circulated. 
That, however, seems to be based on a statistical model rather than taking into account the 
responsibility the extended family system assumed. UNICEF had only identified 200 cases of 
children without any family; the rest live with their mothers and/or the extended family.  
 
Based on the belief that orphaned children would get a better life and more opportunities if they 
were placed in institutions, there was an initial drive by both the GoP and local philanthropists to 
send orphans to orphanages. There were some reports of children being picked up against their will 
by orphanages based in other parts of the country, and of groups offering children for adoption. 
Opposing this approach of institutionalised care, and with a view to supporting child protection in 
their local communities, child-centred NGOs (including, among others, Plan and Save the Children) 
published a position paper that was presented to the Ministry of Social Welfare. Following this, and 
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support from UNICEF, the government adopted a 6-month ban on adoption and is preparing a 
national plan to ensure support for children, widows and the disabled in their communities.  
Emergency Education 
The earthquake hit the education sector particularly hard. More than 18,000 students and 853 
teachers and staff lost their lives in NWFP and AJK. A substantial number of teachers, school staff, 
and students are likely to suffer from emotional trauma and injuries and may require counselling 
services.25 
 
Of total institutions in four districts of AJK, 95%, or 3,685 out of 3,879 buildings, and 53% of the 
buildings in five districts of NWFP, or 3,984 of a total of 7,577 buildings, were reported to have 
been totally or partially damaged.26 
 
Emergency education in camps exposed some children, particularly in the NWFP, to education for 
the first time. This may be capitalised on and seen as an opportunity to provide education to 
children in areas earlier not served. Moreover, the education and child-friendly spaces established 
allowed for a degree of normality that helped children (and their families) to cope better with 
trauma and camp challenges. 
 
Plans are being made to establish emergency schools in areas people are repatriated to, and a 
number of NGOs are involved in rebuilding schools and offering teaching in the interim period. 
NRC has been involved in emergency education but reports difficulties with fund-raising.  
 
 
Illustration 3. Emergency Education in Bhonjaa Valley (Team photo)   
                                                     
25 ADB-WB report of 15 November 2005 
26 Ibid. 
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Staff secondment 
The secondment of staff to UN agencies was organised through the Norwegian Refugee Council’s 
regular emergency preparedness force, funded by the MFA. The team met with a number of 
seconded staff in different positions, with varying contract lengths and responsibilities. They all had 
extensive experience of emergency operations.  
 
Common to them was a high commitment to the task assigned, and for some, a deep frustration over 
the ineffectiveness of the UN agencies they were seconded to. Concerns were raised about senior 
UNHCR field officers refusing to share information with other agencies, officers posing security 
risks through drinking during working hours and security officers imposing seemingly unnecessary 
regulations that limited travel and work possibilities. And, as mentioned earlier, specialised staff 
were not always able to utilise their expertise.  
 
While noting the high esteem in which the Norwegian seconded staff were held in several agencies, 
two concerns arise. One is whether the secondment system, in itself, functions as a band aid on an 
ineffective UN system, rather than leading to the identification of and attention to necessary 
organisational changes and reforms. It is understandable that seconded staff on short-term contracts 
should spend part of their valuable time trying to reform the system, but there seems to be a need 
for a reporting system that can assist the NRC and MFA to identify areas for improvement and to 
demand changes if Norwegian secondment is to be continued. 
 
The second concern relates to the limitation on organisations and positions to which staff can be 
seconded. It would appear useful in emergency operations of this kind if the NRC, embassies and 
even national governments could request that staff be seconded into positions deemed important for 
the overall relief operation. The DfID secondment of cluster head for the shelter cluster is a case in 
point; other positions could be within the government at local or national levels, or include 
specialised advisors to the Humanitarian coordinator. 
Camps for relief workers 
Direktoratet for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap was asked to establish camps for relief workers in 
Bagh, Abottabad and Gari Habibulah, and took later over the Danish-run camp in Batagram, as 
Danes were evacuated following the cartoon case. The costs were covered by the MFA and camp 
management was undertaken in collaboration with WFP, which holds responsibility for staff camps, 
whereas DSB is a member (and currently Chair) of International Humanitarian Partnership. 
 
The first Norwegian team arrived on or around 20 October, and the first camp was established over 
25-28 October. Norwegian camps came with medical supplies and nurses and efforts were made to 
provide recreation to counter the high stress levels the relief workers experienced.  
 
The capacities of the camps varied from about 35 beds to more than a hundred, but the need was 
underestimated when the initial order was made. The camps are due to close between 15 May and 
15 June 2006, but the UN has not made alternative arrangements, despite planning to work for the 
next one to two years out of the hubs. Continuous aftershocks make shifting to regular housing 
risky. 
 
All of those interviewed appreciated the Norwegian-run camps, not only for being well organised, 
and for the quality of the food and services provided, but also for the social environment that was 
established in the camps that helped the relief workers to cope better with a challenging task. 
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d. Long-term perspective 
UN agencies, IOM, several Norwegian NGOs and the Norwegian Red Cross have set out different 
long-term perspectives for their engagement. Many argue for the necessity to meet the needs of the 
still displaced or recently returned population over the summer and possibly next winter, and to 
make use of present organisational structures, equipment and experienced staff in the early 
rehabilitation process. They fear that they might otherwise have to engage in a new emergency 
operation later this year, or that initiatives taken, such as for emergency education, will not be 
sustained by the GoP.  
 
The UN agencies are part of the recovery process, following negotiations with the GoP, though with 
a lower approved budget than suggested. The Norwegian Refugee Council is operating within an 
18-month project timeframe, while Norwegian Church Aid plans for a longer collaboration with 
CWS in the water/sanitation field. Norwegian Red Cross is about to hand over the field hospital to 
the Ministry of Health, accompanied by the training of medical staff to operate it, to increase their 
response capacity. Trucks brought in for the operation will be shifted to a regional store, to be more 
easily accessible in upcoming disasters in the region, while the ICRC is using the opportunity 
offered by the earthquake to plan for a longer term presence in Pakistan.   
e. Norway as donor and facilitator 
The embassy in Islamabad responded speedily to the earthquake, as did the MFA.  The decision to 
support the local NGO Sungi was made immediately, before anyone knew the actual scale of the 
disaster. This gave Sungi the financial foundation to start their relief operation and contributed to 
the setting up of the secretariat for the JACER for national NGO coordination. The decision to fund 
local NGOs seems to have been one of the most strategically important, but least recognised, 
decisions made by the embassy/MFA.  
 
In an emergency where the priorities change rapidly as new information is revealed, it is important 
that donors show flexibility so that real needs can be met. There is a great deal of variation among 
the responsiveness and flexibility of the various donor countries/institutions.  Norway is considered 
by its partners to be a flexible and supportive donor in this regard. The embassy’s engagement in 
Pakistan has been appreciated by all the NGOs supported by the MFA. 
 
These NGOs have further provided very positive feedback with regard to the role the embassy in 
Islamabad played in terms of keeping in touch with the Norwegian organisations in the field, 
providing information about Norwegian policy and priorities, the security situation – particularly in 
regard to the situation arising in the wake of the cartoon case – as well as moral support from the 
facilitation of contact with the regional priest of the Norwegian Seamen’s Mission. 
 
Contact with Norwegian relief personnel working with Norwegian or other agencies seems to have 
been an important informal channel for the embassy to gain information about the situation on the 
ground and to get feedback regarding the working of policies and processes. 
 
Consequently, the Norwegian policy of supporting only NGOs with networks and previous 
experience was correct, and should be adopted in future emergencies. Likewise, given the high 
political and military sensitivity of the areas to be supported – and the cost of operations – it was 
correct to prioritise humanitarian over military relief provision. 
 
NGOs in the field, however, indicate that it would have been useful for them if the embassy had 
been more proactive in influencing high-level decisions, but question whether it had the capacity to 
take on that role. The MFA voices some of the same concerns about reporting to the Ministry and 
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visibility in the donor/UN community and at donor visits/reviews, given the high level of 
Norwegian funding and a wish to profile the Norwegian engagement. The embassy, on their side, 
prioritised strengthening administrative capacity through the secondment offered from MFA, to 
release periods of time for staff to work on the operational/political side. This might illustrate part 
of an inherent dilemma in Norwegian relief provision. There appears, on the one hand, to be an 
increased wish to promote the Norwegian contribution so as to profile Norway’s peacebuilding role, 
while on the other hand, one witnessed a continuation of the more traditional development 
orientation with a beneficiary focus, and an emphasis on strengthening local organisations/ 
authorities and taking on a longer-term perspective. This possible contradiction should be brought 
up for debate in the MFA, NORAD and the embassies to develop a common understanding of how 
to handle a more profiled Norwegian engagement. The Pakistani case, moreover, allows for 
reflection on how this could be handled in a highly volatile environment in the wake of the cartoon 
case.   
f. Conclusion 
The main conclusion is that Norwegian support for the earthquake victims was timely, targeted, 
effective and efficient. This view is supported by individuals and organisations interviewed in the 
field, where MFA, the embassy, Norwegian NGOs and seconded staff received praise. However, 
the entire relief community should appreciate that their capacity was not put to the full test during 
the winter, when the judgement could have been rather different.  
 
All the NGOs involved have either worked in Pakistan or had established long-term partnerships 
with local organisations in the earthquake-affected areas. The local organisations reached the 
earthquake-affected areas early and used their networks to reach out to the affected communities. 
This facilitated a rapid and targeted response. 
 
In view of the delayed start of the UN on the ground, it seems that direct funding (rather than 
through clusters) of UN agencies and NGOs was the only possible effective channel during the first 
phases of the relief operation. 
 
The delayed response, lacking flexibility and willingness to share Norwegian cluster-assigned 
funding, raises the question whether channelling 72 % of Norwegian funding through the UN was 
the best way, or whether this perhaps overstretched the UN’s capacity. Not all the UN agencies had 
the ability to utilise funds efficiently, and not all of them were the best assistance providers in terms 
of results. 
 
Within the limits of this review we have not attempted a detailed overview of how each NOK was 
spent. At this stage it may also be too early to expect the organisations to have a detailed breakdown 
of costs and expenditure. It is, however, advisable that the MFA follows up with the agencies once 
the financial reports are available from the implementing agencies, and we would especially 
recommend a more in-depth review of UNICEF’s assistance provision. 
 
The assistance given to local NGOs such as Sungi seems to have been the best investment in terms 
of rapid and effective response. This demonstrates the value of the embassy building partnerships 
directly with local organisations. Sungi’s experience of working through village-based organisations 
and establishing village-based disaster response committees shows the potential for building 
disaster response capacities among the communities.  
 
It could, however, prove useful, using the Pakistani emergency as a case, to assess the response and 
handling capacity of the embassy and the MFA to contribute more proactively at the policy level. 
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Within this discussion, it would also be worth assessing whether or not it would be wise to try to 
align funding for emergency relief with long-term development assistance and other Norwegian 
priorities. That would open up consideration of whether funds could be used more strategically, 
with greater opportunities to engage in both political and practical implementation processes and in 
exerting influence in policy formulation.  
 
 
 
 
Illustration 4: Helicopters facilitated assistance delivery to remote areas (Team photo) 
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6. General conclusion and issues for further 
consideration 
The general conclusion of this review is that the earthquake assistance was on the whole well 
handled, although everyone benefited from an unusual winter, in spite of the early snowfall and 
record call – after two weeks which were severe in paces, the winter turned unusual mild and dry. 
This, combined with efforts to secure aid to those living highest up, avoided a second wave of 
deaths. It was also fortunate that a concern about epidemics did not materialise; there were only 
minor outbreaks and these were quickly controlled.  
 
Norwegian assistance was diverse, professionally delivered and highly appreciated; and here it 
appeared of importance that only NGOs with previous experience and existing networks in Pakistan 
were prioritised. And, moreover, that NGOs were prioritised over the Norwegian military, as 
conflict sensitivity as well as cost effectiveness needed to be taken into consideration. What might 
be questioned is the exclusive use of the UN channel for the second round of funding, rather than a 
more diversified and NGO-targeted policy. 
 
While the cluster approach was welcomed by most relief actors, there is a need for the further 
improvement and clarification of responsibility, procedures and funding arrangements.  
 
The early recovery and reconstruction phases provide opportunities for influencing policy/ aligning 
the process with existing democratic governance structures. Two concerns are noted where there 
could be a more extended Norwegian role. First, there is uncertainty about the return of the 
earthquake victims, since as many as 30 % are expected to stay on in camps over the next winter 
due to unsettled land ownership, risks associated with return and an inability to rebuild houses. 
Moreover, the GoP has as yet not developed adequate plans for reconstruction, reallocation to safer 
areas or for handling (at national and provincial levels) new emergencies. In both of these areas 
there is Norwegian expertise available that could be of value.    
 
Based on the review, there are four areas to which the review team recommends MFA to pay further 
attention: 
 
1. The cluster approach needs to be further developed if it is to function as a recognised and 
effective coordination mechanism for governments, UN agencies, INGOs and NGOs in 
emergencies. This will include further debates with donors and governments, among UN 
agencies, and with INGOs and NGOs. Moreover, MFA and OCHA need to discuss further 
procedures for direct cluster funding, and all UN agencies need to be brought into the 
debate on cost-free funds transfer to and between agencies, monitoring arrangements and 
reporting requirements. Moreover, there should be an opening to allow for non-UN 
agencies to assume a role as cluster heads, and the IFRC and NGOs are encouraged to 
review their position on assuming such a responsibility. 
 
2. The MFA should initiate an in-depth evaluation of the use of Norwegian cluster funding 
through UN agencies in the Pakistani earthquake operation. Of particular interest is 
UNICEF’s handling of funds and how its application and procurement procedures might 
have influenced how rapidly assistance could be provided and at what cost. 
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3. The MFA could further use the opportunity to initiate a comparative review of funding 
channelled through the Norwegian Red Cross for clinics operated by the ICRC and the 
IFRC and with Norwegian seconded staff. Both the appropriateness of the health facilities, 
in the circumstances, and the price they came at should be reviewed, and a possible 
comparison made with the response following the tsunami in Indonesia. 
 
4. An internal review should be undertaken by the MFA and the embassy in Pakistan on the 
handling of the earthquake response in order to identify best practice in staff secondment, 
priority areas of engagement and reporting requirements.    
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ANNEX I: Terms of Reference 
Arne Strand and Kaja Borchgrevink shall in the period 20 April – 7 May 2006 carry out an 
evaluation as directed below. 
 
1. The main focus shall be placed on the utilisation of the NOK 500 million provided by 
Norway, including Norwegian-financed delivery of goods and services. The team shall 
assess the utility and sustainability of these efforts, and the collaboration between 
Norwegian actors and the recipient organisation in Pakistan/other actors.  Particular 
attention shall be given to challenges and problems related to potential administrative and 
personnel-related constraints, logistics, knowledge transfer and practical implementation of 
the assistance. 
 
2. In addition to the above, the following aspects will be described and discussed: 
 
- Norwegian actors’ pre-assistance planning, including contact between themselves, as 
well as between other actors and the MFA/other parts of the Norwegian state 
administration; 
 
- The extent to which the actors were able to draw on experience from earlier natural 
disasters; 
 
- Collaboration between Norwegian actors in the field; 
 
- The interplay between Norwegian external actors and respectively the Norwegian 
Embassy, the UN system and the Pakistani civilian and military administration; 
 
- The cluster system: utility, strengths and weaknesses, including Norwegian actors’ 
participation in the system; 
 
- Norwegian actors’ ability and readiness also to promote long-term perspectives in the 
relief work, for example through investment in the education sector (so-called 
‘Emergency Education’); 
 
- The actors’ maintenance of gender perspectives in the relief work. 
 
3. In addition to the above, the team shall address and discuss other aspects of the 
humanitarian efforts after the earthquake that are considered of interest to the MFA. 
 
4. The team shall produce a report on the assignment by the end of May 2006. 
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ANNEX II: Interview List 
 
Name    Position   Organisation 
 
Janis Bjørn Kanavin  Ambassador to Pakistan MFA 
Torill Johansen   First Secretary (Pak.)  MFA 
Hårek Aspenes   First Secretary (Pak.)  MFA 
Bjørn Johannessen  Senior Advisor   MFA 
Geir Moe Sørensen  Senior Advisor   MFA 
Arne Jan Flølo   Advisor   MFA 
Zaheer    Engineer   ERRA 
Brian Kelly   Shelter Coord.   IOM 
Hassan Abdel  
Moneim Mostafa  Regional Repr.   IOM 
Hugo B. Ark   FSO/RCO   IOM 
Sobia Rahat   Field Specialist   IOM 
Omar Abdi   Country Director  UNICEF 
    Protection Cluster  UNICEF 
    Education Cluster  UNICEF 
Michael Jones   Country Director  WFP 
Jan J. Vandemoortele  UNHC/Res. Coord.  UNDP/OCHA 
Haoliang Xu   Country Director  UNDP 
Mohammed Zafar Iqbal  Assistant Res. Repr.  UNDP 
Earl James Goodyear  Senior Advisor    UNDP 
Mohammed Usman Qazi Programme Officer  UNDP 
Guenet Guebre-Christios Representative   UNHCR 
Michael J. Zwack  Dep. Representative  UNHCR 
Mia Haglund Heelas  Country Director  Plan 
Dr Irfan Ahmed  Health Advisor   Plan 
Farooq Dar   Grants Manager  Plan  
Terje Thodesen   Head of Office   UNICEF Muzaffarabad 
Gro Anett Nicolaysen      UNHCR Muzaffarabad 
France Donnay   Representative   UNFPA 
Safia Bano       IOM Muzaffarabad 
Zel Mengistu   Head of Sub-Office  IOM Balakot 
Major Shaheed       Pakistan Army, Balakot 
Zaniab Raza   Associate Director  CWS 
Mansoor Raza   DRP Coordinator  CWS 
Connie Cheung   Recovery Coordinator  CWS  
Ola Forsmark   Project Manager (Pak)  NCA 
Arild Isaksen   Head of Section (N)  NCA 
Anne Angeltveit  Expert (Pak/N)   NCA 
Guro Wenaas   Programme Officer   (N) NCA 
Elisabeth Mustorp  Head of Section (N)  NCA 
Samina Khan   Executive Director  Sungi 
Umar Khan   Programme Manager  Sungi   
Mansoor Ahmad Awan  Programme Manager  Sungi  
Stig Traavik    Country Representative  NRC 
Ann Kristin Brunborg   Programme Manager  NRC 
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Arshad Aziz   ICLA Programme  NRC 
Simon Goede   NFI/Shelter PM  NRC 
Michael Shaadt   Reporting Officer  NRC 
John Joseph   Diocesan Exec. Secretary  Caritas Pakistan 
Bertrand Lamon  Dep. Head of Delegation ICRC 
Tom Glue   EcoSec Coordinator  ICRC 
Iliana Mourad   Health Coordinator  ICRC 
Halvor Fossum Lauritzsen Head of Int. Department Norwegian Red Cross 
Kristin Lunden   Relief Coordinator  Norwegian Red Cross 
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ANNEX III: Funding Overview 
 
NORWEGIAN 
FUNDING 
        
          
PAKISTAN 
EARTHQUAKE 
ASSISTANCE 
        
          
Organisation Date Budget 
NOK 
Budget 
USD 
Purpose 
WHO  10.okt 1633000 251230 health 
WHO    4000000 615384   
WHO Total   5633000 866615   
          
WFP via DSB 21.okt 20000000 3076923 Coordination centre, including DSB 
camp 
WFP UN Logistics 04.nov 12500000 1923076 Logistics 
WFP   04.nov 10000000 1538461
WFP 10.nov 30000000 4615384
Logistics: WFP(42,8), ATLAS(4.75), 
IOM(6,74), UNOPS(13,9), 
WFP   102400000 15753846 Food: WFP (28,6), Communication: 
(5,6) 
WFP Total   174900000 26907692   
          
          
          
OCHA 14.okt 6275000 965384 Cash contribution 
OCHA 21.okt 3600000 553846 Relief supplies, Brindisi, incl. air 
transport 
OCHA   5600000 861538 Coordination 
OCHA Total   15475000 2380769   
          
UNHCR 04.nov 7000000 1076923   
UNHCR   33000000 5076923 Camp management 
UNHCR Total   40000000 6153846   
          
UNFPA 04.nov 3000000 461538   
          
OCHA/UNICEF 14.okt 6000000 923076 UNICEF 
UNICEF 04.nov 10000000 1538461   
UNICEF 10.nov 20000000 3076923  
UNICEF   68000000 10461538 Food/nutrition, wat/san (incl N 
equipment), protection, education 
UNICEF Total   104000000 15076923   
          
UNDP   47000000 7230769 Shelter – IOM /shelter cluster  
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NATO 19.okt 3000000 461538   
NATO 19.okt 2000000 307692   
NATO   5000000 769230   
NATO Total   10000000 1538461   
          
NCA 21.okt 4200000 646153 Food, tents and Norwegian coordinator 
NCA 31.okt 3300000 507692 Blankets, tents, wat/san 
NCA 31.okt 927000 142615 Tents, blankets and tarpaulins 
NCA Total   8427000 1296461   
          
Plan Norge 01.nov 2000000 307692 Children; food, medicine, tent, blankets 
          
MSF 11.nov 440000 67692 Construction material and transport 
MSF   443713 68263   
MSF Total   883713 135955   
          
Caritas 04.nov 2625000 403846 Through CWS: ER, wat/san,  
Caritas 04.nov 3605000 554615 CWS 
Caritas   6230000 958461   
          
Redd Barna 31.okt 5000000 769230 ER 
          
NRC   10000000 1538461 ER and shelter distribution, camp 
management and training, protection, 
winter survival training. 
NRC 18.okt 1500000 230769 Secondments  
NRC Total   11500000 1769230   
          
Care   4380000 673846   
          
Sungi 
Development 
Foundation 
24.okt 5000000 769230 ER and rehabilitation, direct funding 
through the embassy in Islamabad 
          
Red Cross 25.okt 20000000 3076923 ICRC, hospital, delegates, storage and 
cash 
Red Cross 25.okt 12000000 1846153 IFRC, 36 M6 trucks, cash 
Red Cross 25.okt 15000000 2307692 Field hospital and health kit 
Red Cross 02.nov 13000000 2000000 ICRC and IFRC 
Red Cross Total   60000000 9230769   
          
DSB   10299506 1584539   
DSB   1108400 170523 Norwegian UNDAC support 
DSB   1204910 185370 Norwegian Support Team 
DSB   650000 100000 Workshop 
DSB Total   13262816 2040433   
          
SOS Barnebyer 24.okt 1000000 153846 ER and psychosocial support 
SOS Barnebyer 10.nov 2800000 430769 Tents 
SOS Barnebyer   3800000 584615   
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Total 
          
KRD   1000000 153846 Diaspora 
          
Norad   500000 76923 To manage smaller Norwegian 
earthquake response initiatives 
          
FD   65000 10000 Tents and blankets 
          
TOTAL   522056529 80316389   
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SUMMARY
,
The massive earthquake that struck northern parts of Pakistan and India on 8 
October 2005, led to the loss of more than 75 000 lives, 100 000 were severely 
injured and 2.8 million were left without shelter. The relief response was immediate 
but demanding. It was a race against time to provide assistance before the onset 
of winter and to reach the most remote areas.  
The Norwegian Government responded quickly, and prioritised support to 
Norwegian NGOs with prior experience and networks in Pakistan, Pakistani NGOs 
with a strong local presence and UN agencies. The total Norwegian earthquake 
assistance was NOK 522 million, and was generally judged to be delivered in a 
professional, effective and efficient manner. 
The new UN Cluster approach was tested in Pakistan. Cluster Heads assigned 
responsibilities as to agencies with technical expertise, while OCHA had an 
overall coordination responsibility. This evaluation finds that while the cluster 
approach improves the relief work, there are a number of weaknesses identified 
which needs further attention. An important weakness in the current response 
was that gender issues and women were not prioritised, despite the fact that 
women had taken on much of the early relief responsibility in the villages, and 
were particularly vulnerable in the camp environment.
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